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ARTICLES
REGULATION OF INTERCONNECTED ELECTRIC
UTILITIES: SOME JURISDICTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
James J. Lopach*
Dennis R. Lopach**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Montana residents have been interested for a long time in public policy questions concerning utility regulation. Although this feeling in Montana has been intense, the governmental response has
been little different from the experiences of other states. State legislatures in the early twentieth century established regulatory commissions with control over utility companies to protect the consuming public. Such enactments have been recognized by courts as
legitimate expressions of the state's police power.' Establishment of
federal regulatory agencies paralleled the state activity, but the
division of regulatory power between the two levels historically has
favored the states. Congress noted in the Federal Power Act that it
intended to preserve the states' regulatory control over public utilities.3 Today, however, changing circumstances may lead to displacement of Helena and other state capitals by Washington as the
power center of utility regulation.
The diminution of state utility-related regulation would have
major implications for Montana residents. One aspect of regulation
concerned with energy production especially seems to be at stake,4
certification and control over the location of utility facilities.' Montana has been involved in regulating generation sites and transmis* Assistant Professor of Political Science and Associate Director, Bureau of Government Research, University of Montana.
** Third year student, School of Law, University of Montana.

1. See M.

GLASSER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM

16 (1957).

2. Public Service Commission v. City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 P. 24, 27 (1916).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1970).
4. The most familiar and long-standing area of utility regulation deals with rates and
service. See REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 70-101
et seq.
5. The Montana Legislature created the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation in 1971, R.C.M. 1947, § 82A-1501 et seq., and in 1973 the Montana Utility Siting Act,
R.C.M. 1947, § 70-801 et seq. vested in the State Board of Natural Resources and Conservation the authority to approve or reject applications by utilities for new facility sites. R.C.M.
1947, § 70-810 prohibits the Board from granting a certificate unless it finds that "duly
authorized state air and water quality agencies have certified that the proposed facility will
not violate state and federally established standards ..
"
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sion corridors for only a few years, but the controversy surrounding
the state's first activity in this field' rivals the political acrimony
that traditionally has accompanied regulation of utility prices and
operations. The controversy is heightened because of the interests
held in the balance: Montana's environmental integrity and the
energy requirements of a multi-state area.
The two coal-fired electrical generating units at Colstrip, Montana, would be a part of an interstate utility network which would
transmit electricity generated in Montana to consumers throughout
the Pacific Northwest. Even though this system would serve residents of many states, the initial decision whether or not to permit
construction rests solely with Montana. The Colstrip certification
question could provide the impetus for sweeping regulatory change
capable of advancing regional interests with respect to interstate
electrical systems. In the past decade, Congress has failed to realign
state and federal authority over utility plant siting in order to eliminate the problem of unilateral state action. Should congressional
inaction continue, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution7 might provide the legal underpinning for such regulatory
change. The purpose of this article is to place the Montana public
discussion about the Colstrip plants in a heretofore absent, but
seemingly indispensable, context-the allowable reach of state action affecting interstate commerce.
This article will discuss, in turn, how recent developments in
electric utility technology can provide benefits to a multi-state area,
and how these advantages cannot be realized under the existing
regulatory system. It will be argued that regulatory reform is
needed, but most likely will not be forthcoming from Congress, and
that a legal challenge based on the Commerce Clause to the present
regulatory framework might therefore be sustained.
II.

THE ADVANTAGES OF ELECTRIC UTILITY INTERCONNECTION

A general statement about current trends in electric utility
technology is that interconnected operations are favored from a
number of perspectives. This view is not based exclusively on industry and government statistics predicting substantial growth in coming years in demand for electricity. Its significance is primarily due
to the fact that many problems created by increased demand can
be collectively resolved by utility operation and coordination on a
6. The Board of Natural Resources and Conservation presently has under consideration
the application of The Montana Power Company and four other northwest utility companies
for certification of two generating plants at Colstrip, Montana, and a high voltage transmission line from Colstrip to Hot Springs, Montana.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/1

2

REGULATION
OF UTILITIES
1976]
Lopach and
Lopach: Regulation of
Interconnected Electric
Utilities: Some Jurisdictional Considerations
multi-state basis. Specifically, claims are being heard today on
technological grounds that small and restricted utility systems cannot meet future demands and secure potential economic and environmental advantages. Utility interconnection technology and arguments in favor of interconnected utility systems will be described
below.
A.

Electric Utility Interconnection

Recent technological developments in the electric power industry permit a scope of utility operation that renders state boundaries
insignificant. Advances in methods of generating and transmitting
electricity have made a regional approach to meeting increased future demand more promising than isolated single company efforts.
An electric power company today can install a generating unit with
a capacity in excess of 1,000 megawatts. Additionally, it has become
feasible to transmit electricity from the generation site over extremely high voltage lines to distant customers. Economies of scale
can accompany the large generating plants, but in most instances,
single electric utility systems do not have sufficient demand and
projected growth to warrant the massive capital outlay that large
generating plants 'require.8 As a result, interconnections between
separate utility companies have become a widespread practice in
the electric power industry.
Interconnecting, pooling, and coordination are essentially similar approaches to utility cooperation.' Two generating systems are
interconnected when they are joined by a high power transmission
line through which electric current from either of the systems can
be transmitted to the other. This type of mutual arrangement can
also include provision for transmission reliability (that is, the lines
of the separate systems can withstand equally intense power
surges), and centralized dispatching of electricity (that is, each system surrenders its autonomous control over assignment of the electricity it generates to various locations). Interconnected electric
utility systems can, therefore, in different degrees, approach the
operating status of a single system.
B. Future Demand for Electricity
The substantially increased demand that consumers are expected to place on the electric power industry during coming years
is one reason electric utilities have turned to multi-state energy
8. Miller, A Needed Reform of the Organizationand Regulation of the Interstate Electric Power Industry, 38 FORD. L. REv. 635, 640 (1970).
9. See S. BREYER and P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION 97-98 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BREYER] for a discussion of power pooling.
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systems. The Federal Power Commission (F.P.C.) estimated in 1964
that the nation would require approximately 300 million kilowatts
of new generating capacity between 1967 and 1980.1° The Project
Independence Report of the Federal Energy Administration
(F.E.A.) stated that demand for electricity has been increasing at
an annual rate of seven percent." Because of energy loss during
generation and transmission and a peak and valley pattern of consumer demand, generating capacity must be increased in excess of
the average rate of growth in consumption. The F.E.A. concluded
that with the seven percent annual growth rate in demand, more
than six times the 1970's electricity capacity would be needed by the
year 2000 to satisfy the total national demand."
Responsibility for meeting the projected increase in demand for
electricity will fall on investor-owned utilities. There are over 3,500
utility systems in the nation's electric power industry, 3 only seven
percent of which are investor-owned. However, the dominance of the
investor-owned utilities in the electric power industry can be appreciated from the fact that they supply approximately 80 percent of
the nation's retail need for electricity. 4
The increased generating capacity will have the following
sources (in approximate percentages): hydroelectric plants, 11 percent; fossil-fueled thermal plants near urban centers, 38 percent;
mine-mouth thermal plants, 22 percent; nuclear plants, 22 percent;
pumped storage plants, 6 percent; and peaking plants, 1 percent. 5
Given the industry's vertically integrated organization, investorowned utilities will retail the bulk of the power they produce directly
LU ul niabe consumers.
Interconnection and Cost Savings
Utility technology provides interconnecting electric power companies with significant benefits, such as reduction of the high costs
inherent in their present mode of operation. In planning its generating capacity, an electric company knows that a number of circumstances can cause its average consumer demand to be exceeded.
Reserve capacity must be provided to handle such eventualities as
daily and seasonal peak demand periods, plant shutdowns for maintenance work, and occasional plant failure. As a result, "a typical
10.

FEDERAL

ENERGY

[hereinafter cited as F.E.A.

ADMINISTRATION,

PROJECT INDEPENDENCE

REPORT

173 (1974)

REPORT].

11.

Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 182 in Appendix.
Miller, supra note 8 at 641.
Id.
Id.at 658.
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utility system must have an installed generation capacity about
twice the average load demand.""6 To restate the situation, only 50
percent of the potential annual generating capability of electric utilities is actually used. Because the electric power industry is capital
intensive, the construction, financing, and maintenance costs of this
reserve capacity ultimately find their way into consumer prices by
way of rate base calculations and operating expense allowances.
Utilities have entered into cooperative arrangements to reduce
the capital outlays and operating expenses necessitated by maintenance of an adequate reserve generating capacity. The financial
motive for cooperative ventures is by itself overwhelming. The
F.E.A. reported that:
the most pressing financial problem in the energy sector pertains
to public utilities. This is true in terms of its immediacy, its size
and its impact on future energy supply. . . . The current inability
to raise substantial amounts of capital and the uncertainty of demand forecasts are causing utilities to delay construction of long
lead-time, high capital, low fuel cost base-load plants.... 17
Public utilities, through such forms of cooperation as power pools
and regional utility councils, have sought to realize important cost
savings in the following five categories: 1) operating costs, because
power plants can be used in priority of marginal efficiency; 2) peak
demand generating costs, because there is a vast difference in energy consumption in different areas with respect to seasonal and
daily periods; 3) reserve costs, because sharing reserve capacity can
reduce capital outlays; 4) plant costs, because the economies of
scale inherent in large generators can be enjoyed by small utilities
through cooperation; and 5) transmission costs, because coordinated planning can increase reliability by precluding breakdown
due to power surges. 8
D.

Interconnectionand Environmental Protection

Although for years the American public held electric utilities to
the twin performance standards of reasonable price levels and service reliability, another public concern has increasingly been expressed during the last decade. Friends and protectors of the environment presently are calling attention to the damage that utility
facilities can do to air and water purity. Environmental protection
is another reason for advocating interconnected utility systems
which might reduce overall environmental degradation.
16. F.E.A. REPORT, supra note 10 at 124.
17. Id. at 285.
18. BREYER, supra note 9 at 91-93.
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This discussion will proceed from the assumption that the
American public will continue their present life style and will necessarily insist upon considerable expansion of utility facilities, which
would inevitably result in some measure of permanent damage to
the environment. In the interests of environmental protection, the
question of whether the logic of beneficial interconnection extends
to conservation considerations as well as to cost and service reliability concerns must be examined.
It can be argued that coordinated regional power systems will
sufficiently satisfy the environmental sensitivities of a majority of
Americans. Construction of a large number of small, uncoordinated,
inefficient, urban-based power facilities could result in unnecessary
environmental harm. Construction of power plants as a part of a
regional energy system, however, could substantially reduce the
amount of utility plant expansion and, consequently, environmental harm if viewed from a multi-state perspective.' 9
The single-state perspective may be radically different, however. Residents of a state such as Montana may feel that they have
much to lose and little to gain from a regional power system. Montanans could find themselves giving up the state's most environmentally sound utility sites for which the state has no current but
possible future need in order to meet the energy needs of residents
of other states. While the environmental quality of the consuming
areas would be maintained, that of Montana, the generating area,
would be altered.
In sum, the practical question is whose environment is to be
exploited, and the vantage point is all-important. From the Montana perspective, the regional resolution tends to be black or white,
with single-state gain or loss seen as the sole issue. From the multistate view, which must be reckoned with seriously because of reinforcing technological and cost considerations, a regional resolution
means fewer facilities and overall decreased environmental damage.
The key issue simply put is, to what degree should one state's environmentalism be allowed to interfere with construction and operation of part of an integrated utility system, when that system serves
consumers in several states?
E.

Interconnection in Practice

Despite the existence of the'arguments for increased utility
interconnection, there was insignificant growth in pooling arrangements between 1963 and 1970.0 Utilities have failed to achieve the
full benefit of interconnection because attempts at coordination
19.
20.

Id. at 93.
Id. at 98.
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have been loose and incomplete. Centralized authority in the power
pools has been insufficient to realize the optimum benefit from a
minimum reserve capacity; to schedule plant utilization, excess
energy exchange, and plant maintenance; and to complement peak
demand characteristics of separate utilities. The typical power pool
lacks centralized power dispatching, centralized planning of plant
additions, and system-wide operating standards. Individual utility
companies, therefore, have taken the initiative in designing new
facilities, and merely 2have submitted these plans to a power pool
committee for review. 1
The judgment of industry observers is that power pools and
reliability councils have not fully realized these benefits because
association ties have been too informal and operating decisions have
not been made by a central authority. 22 Thus, interconnection has
yet to bestow on the consuming public its promise of reduced costs,
increased reliability, and environmental protection.
When the electric utility industry is loosely coordinated, total
system costs cannot be reduced. Capital additions are not foregone
unless a company is positive that it will be able to depend upon the
reserve generating capacity of another company. The only substitute for self-sufficiency is a well-planned and well-run system of
interdependency.
III.

PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION TODAY:

A

FAILURE TO ADDRESS

REGIONAL NEEDS

The benefits to be gained from interconnection discussed
above-ability to meet increased demand, reduced costs, and restricted environmental damage-may not be forthcoming under the
current regulatory scheme. Utility regulation is currently the responsibility of both state and federal commissions, with the state
agencies holding the bulk of authority. Because state regulatory
jurisdiction ends at the state line, state regulation cannot provide
the impetus necessary to achieve regional benefits of interconnection. The electric power industry, whose impact has so many national ramifications, demands a unified and comprehensive regulatory response.
A.

Limited Powers of the F.P.C.

Federal utility regulation, as it now exists, cannot provide a
workable design for an interstate electric power system. The F.P.C.
possesses a limited form of national jurisdiction, but its authority
21.

A discussion of power pools' mode of operation is found in WEST REGIONAL ADVISORY
1970, 1980, 1990, 5-2 to 5-16 (1969).
BREYER, supra note 9 at 109.

COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE OF POWER IN THE WEST REGION,

22.
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to act within this jurisdiction is severely limited. Congress has not
given the F.P.C. the power to put the nation's electric utility industry on a fully integrated basis. As a result, the F.P.C. historically
has not acted "as if it realized that economy, reliability, and protection of the environment are interrelated goals that call for coordinated industry planning." 3
Congress has given the F.P.C. responsibility for regulating the
operations of the electric utility industry only to the degree that
state utility commissions have not undertaken a parallel regulatory
activity. This division of labor is an important aspect of the Federal
Power Act that states that federal regulatory powers are to "extend
only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the
States." 4 More specifically, the Act states that federal regulation
"shall not . . . deprive a State or State Commission of its lawful
authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy
which is transmitted across a State line."2 5 As it now stands, the
Federal Power Act anticipates a two-tiered, mutually exclusive system of regulation.
The division of regulatory jurisdiction has developed as follows:
the F.P.C. has controlled licensing of hydroelectric generating
plants, interstate transmission of some electricity, and rates for interstate wholesale of electricity;2 6 state utility commissions have
had indisputable control over retail electricity rates, generation and
local distribution facilities, and facilities used to transmit electric
energy in intrastate commerce. 7 Two standards have been used
most often for determining whether regulatory jurisdiction should
be exercised by the F.P.C. or by state commissions. These are the
interstate and the wholesale characteristics of any energy transaction, which give rise to F.P.C. control. The F.P.C., however, has not
interpreted its jurisdiction in a consistent fashion, and, as a result,
it has been "virtually impossible to know, at any single point in
time, over which companies it had jurisdiction." 28
The United States Supreme Court, in recent years, has ruled"
on the meaning of the specific phrases, "transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce ' 3° and "sale of electric energy at
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 119.
16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1970).
16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1970).
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REG-

ULATION OF ELECTRIC, GAS, AND TELEPHONE UTILITIES

27.

(1973).

Id.

28.

BREYER, supra note 9 at 89.
29. F.P.C. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972); F.P.C. v. Union Elec. Co.,
381 U.S. 90 (1965); F.P.C. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1970).
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wholesale in interstate commerce."'" The extent of the F.P.C.'s jurisdiction has, thereby, been somewhat clarified. In F.P.C. v. Southern California Edison Co., the Court said the Federal Power Act
granted the F.P.C. "jurisdiction of all sales of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce not expressly exempted by the Act
itself .... *"32 The Federal Power Act, the Court ruled, clearly distinguished between state and federal regulatory jurisdiction: "It cut
sharply and clearly between sales for resale and direct sales for
consumptive uses. ' 33 The view that the F.P.C.'s jurisdiction over
interstate energy sales at wholesale should be determined by a
"case-by-case analysis"34 was soundly rejected.
In F.P.C. v. Union Electric Co. ,3 and again in F.P.C. v. Florida
Power and Light Co. ,3 the Supreme Court dealt with the other basic
criterion of the F.P.C.'s jurisdiction. In both instances, the Court
inquired if interstate or intrastate commerce was present. This
question went to the heart of the F.P.C.'s constitutional underpinning-exactly what are the dimensions of interstate commerce? In
other words, the Court was asking over how broad an area can the
F.P.C. exercise its powers?
In F.P.C. v. Union Electric Co., the Supreme Court stated that
"the interstate transmission of electric energy is fully subject to the
commerce powers of Congress. 3 7 It then found that power projects
which generate electricity for an interstate power system "affect
commerce among the States and therefore are within the purview
of the commerce power ....
,"31 The import of the majority opinion
was underscored by the dissenting Justice Goldberg. He said that
the upholding of F.P.C. jurisdiction where "a project affects the
interests of interstate or foreign commerce in any way, seems to be
based upon an overly literal reading of the statute. ' 3 The majority
opinion substantially expanded the meaning of interstate commerce
with respect to utility regulation and thus F.P.C. jurisdiction.
In F.P.C. v. FloridaPower and Light Co., the Supreme Court
went even further in defining interstate commerce. Here it found
that electricity was transmitted in interstate commerce by a utility
company when none of its transmission lines directly tied into those
of out-of-state companies. But because the utility company was
31. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1970).
32. F.P.C. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra note 29 at 210.
33. Id. at 214, citing Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. P.S.C., 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947).
34. Id. at 215.
35. F.P.C. v. Union Elec. Co., supra note 29.
36. F.P.C. v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra note 29.
37. F.P.C. v. Union Elec. Co., supra note 29 at 94, citing Public Util. Comm'n of RI.
v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 94 (1927).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
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linked to another in-state utility which was connected to an out-ofstate utility, the Court decided that "energy was commingled...
and thus was transmitted in interstate commerce." 0 Again, the
implication of the decision was spelled out by a dissenting justice.
Justice Douglas said'the result is that "every privately owned interconnected facility in the United States . . . is within the F.P.C.'s
jurisdiction .41
The United States Supreme Court, accordingly, has given a
national scope to the F.P.C.'s jurisdiction. The actual or potential
effectiveness of the F.P.C., however, cannot be appreciated in terms
of jurisdiction alone. To secure the benefits of regional utility systems, the F.P.C. must possess sufficient authority to act within the
full extent of its jurisdiction. In terms of powers, the Commission is
not well equipped.
The F.P.C.'s regulatory reach is inadequate because Congress
has not put the proper tools into its hand. The only generating
facilities which now fall within the Commission's jurisdiction are
hydroelectric dams. 42 The F.P.C. has no authority over licensing of
thermal generating plants, 4 over the construction of transmission
lines that carry electricity in interstate commerce that are not
linked to a hydroelectric dam, 44 or over transmission facilities linked
to a thermal plant that carry electricity directly to ultimate consumers.4 5 This lack of power is significant because thermal power
plants "now provide over ninety percent of the electricity generated
by investor-owned public utilities in the country '"' 4 and will provide
"eighty percent of generating capacity which is to be installed by
1980."41
The specific authority that the F.P.C. lacks but which is necessary to pursue the objectives of cost savings, power reliability, and
environmental protection, is the power to require interconnection.
One study of electric utility interconnection concluded that the best
source of competence in the federal government for designing and
implementing a schedule of industry integration is the F.P.C. 41 In
1935 the F.P.C. was given the power to order interconnections, but
such action can be taken only "upon application of any State commission or of any person (utility company) engaged in the transmis40. F.P.C. v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra note 29 at 458.
41. Id. at 471.
42. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. F.P.C., 95 S.Ct. 1066, 1082 (1975).
43. Id.at 1076.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1970).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1970). See also, Miller, supra note 8 at 639.
46. Miller, supra note 8 at 639.
47. Id. at 660.
48. Wirtz, Electric Utility Interconnections:Power to the People, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1714,
1733 (1959).
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sion or sale of electric energy.""9 Prior to 1964, 97 percent of the
nation's generating capacity already was linked together in varying
degrees of interdependence in five pooling systems." Since 1964, the
Commission has processed a "steady flow of 202 (b) applications"
from municipal utilities.5 ' In addition to the Section 202 (b) authority, the Federal Power Act gives the F.P.C. the power to order temporary interconnections "whenever the Commission determines
that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the
demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy, or of
facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy. .. 52 Frequent use was made of this provision during World
War II, but it has since seen little use.
The F.P.C., however, has sought increased interconnection
after a fashion even though it lacked the power to require it. Since
1964, the "F.P.C. has actively encouraged coordination," 53 and since
the 1965 power blackout in the northeastern United States, the
Commission has sponsored the organization of regional reliability
councils.'
Neither the F.P.C.'s persuasive efforts nor the industry's reliability councils have achieved a very high degree of coordination. The
regional councils primarily have been concerned with increasing the
reliability of transmission facilities and not with the cost savings
and reduced environmental damage possible through close coordination of generating facilities. And these largely voluntary efforts
are not subject to comprehensive planning or supervision by a
government agency. 5
B.

State Regulatory Deficiencies

The pattern of fragmented electric utility operation is paralleled by the narrow jurisdiction of state regulatory bodies. These
state regulatory commissions were set up early in this century to
meet the need for flexibility and expert knowledge in attempting to
achieve fair utility rates and reasonable service." The Montana
49.

16 U.S.C. § 824(a)(b) (1970). This is Section 202(b) of Part II of the Federal Power

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Wirtz, supra note 48 at 1718.
Id.at 1719.
16 U.S.C. §§ 824a.(a), 824a.(c) (1970).
BREYER, supra note 9 at 94.
Id. at 97.

Act.

55. Ross, Power and the Environment" A Statutory Approach to Electric Facility
Siting, 47 WASH. L. REV. 39 (1971).

56. J. Lopach, The Montana Public Service Commission: A Profile of Weakness,
AFFAIm REPORT No. 17, 1 (April, 1974), Bureau of Government Research,

MONTANA PUBLIC

University of Montana.
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Public Service Commission (P.S.C.) was established in 1913;11 by
1921, all but one state, Delaware, had set up a regulatory commission with control over utilities." These utility commissions are creatures of state legislatures, possessing only those powers which the
legislative body confers on them.59
Despite the Public Service Commission's responsibilities concerning utility rates and service, 0 it lacks many of the powers that
other state commissions have to regulate the internal business operations of utilities.' For example, the P.S.C. is not permitted to do
the following things: require or authorize interconnection of electric
utilities; require one utility to "wheel" power for other utilities (that
is, make its transmission facilities available to enable a power supply contract between two other unconnected utilities), authorize
initiation of service; regulate exports of electricity; authorize hydroelectric development; or regulate the sale, merger, and purchase
of facilities.
Most state regulatory commissions have the authority to control initiation of service and construction of facilities by electric
utilities through a licensing or certification process.2 If diligently
exercised, this power can prevent construction of excess generation
capacity and inflation of consumer rates. Montana, Texas, and
Hawaii are the only states whose public service commissions possess
no power to license or issue certificates." This deficiency means that
the Montana P.S.C. does not pass on initiation of electric service
by a utility and construction of major additions to electric transmission and distribution lines. Additionally the P.S.C. does not set
standards and evaluate the effect of utility facilities on air and
water quality, water rights and usage, and land usage. Furthermore,
57. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-101. A 1974 amendment of this section expanded the number of
Commissioners to five, and provided that they shall be elected from separate districts.
58. J. Lopach, The Montana Public Service Commission: A Study in Administrative
Decision-Making 6, May, 1973 (unpublished thesis in University of Montana Library).
59. Great Northern Util. Co. v. P.S.C., 88 Mont. 180, 207, 293 P. 294, 298 (1930).
60. The Montana Legislature has given the P.S.C. the job of auditing the books of each
utility company under its jurisdiction (R.C.M. 1947, § 70-109); the power to initiate rate
investigations (R.C.M. 1947, § 70-106); and the duty to prescribe fair rates of return for the
utility companies (R.C.M. 1947, § 70-106). The P.S.C. also is to determine if the companies
have sufficient facilities to promote the safety, convenience and interests of consumers
(R.C.M. 1947, §§ 70-101-70-105). Additionally, the P.S.C. is authorized to establish and
supervise a uniform system of accounts for utilities (R.C.M. 1947, § 70-107); to approve the
issuance of securities and bonds (R.C.M. 1947, § 70-117.1); to approve the abandonment of
services (R.C.M. 1947, §§ 70-101-70-105); and to be on watch for discrimination in provision
of services (R.C.M. 1947, § 70-105).
61. Information on the jurisdiction and powers of the Montana Public Service Commission is derived from the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Operations publication, STATE UTILIrY COMMISSIONs 23-33 and Chart V facing 34 (1967).
62. Id. at 97.

63.

Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/1

12

1976]
Lopach and
Lopach: RegulationREGULATION
of Interconnected Electric
Utilities: Some Jurisdictional Considerations
OF UTILITIES

the P.S.C. does not have authority to set legal standards for and to
evaluate relative environmental impacts of alternative utility sites
and to set criteria for evaluating projected utility needs. To fill this
regulatory vacuum, the Montana Legislature created the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation in 1971,11 and in 1973,
gave the State Board of Natural Resources the authority to approve
or reject applications by utilities for new facility sites." Thus, the
Montana utility regulatory scheme is incapable of both considering
regional energy needs and of dealing with state utility problems in
an integrated fashion.
The Montana Public Service Commission represents the extreme situation of state utility regulatory bodies with respect to
inadequate jurisdiction and authorization for achieving an integrated electric utility industry. Although Congress expressed its intent in the Federal Power Act to preserve and rely on state utility
regulation, this policy may be currently out of touch with the nation's energy needs and the state agencies' abilities. Most utilities
undoubtedly prefer continued regulation by the states, as opposed
to federal agency regulation," but forces are already in motion to
undo "a regulatory pattern which has become an impediment to the
efficient, economic, and timely supply of the power needs of the
country."7
IV.

SOME REGULATORY REFORM PROPOSALS: CONGRESSIONAL
INACTION IN THE FACE OF REGIONAL ENERGY NEEDS

There is no doubt that in coming years one of Congress' major
preoccupations will be energy-related policy. Many of the considerations that will go into these deliberations are predictable. Consumers are becoming increasingly upset about the level of electricity
rates that they are paying. Utilities are concerned that they will be
unable to finance the plant additions necessary for meeting growing
consumer demand. Environmentalists are seeking to protect natural
resources against the damaging effects of new utility facilities. And,
states are desirous of preserving their regulatory jurisdiction and of
thereby securing their own objectives.
Congress could take due notice of other matters. Whereas the
most efficient electric generating plants require a regional market,
"provincialism" has been a major obstacle to pooling. 8 The authorization of these multi-state projects "must entail a surrender by each
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

R.C.M. 1947, § 82A-1501.
R.C.M. 1947, § 70-801 et seq.
Ross, supra note 55 at 43.
Miller, supra note 8 at 635.
BRYEE, supra note 9 at 110-111.
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state commission of some of its parochial concern in the interests
of all of the affected market.""9 It seems highly doubtful, however,
that separate utilities and state agencies can achieve through voluntary cooperation the equivalent of 3ingle system harmony. Such
coordination "involves complicated problems of engineering, economics, finance, law, and politics .. ."0 Besides the probable
unwillingness and inability of state regulatory agencies to cooperate
with each other, there also is bound to be considerable doubt about
their competence to carry out a regulatory task of this proportion.
The resources of state regulatory bodies are few and their failures
are near legend, 7' and this reputation undoubtedly will have some
influence on congressional policy making.
Another major consideration of Congress will be the present
fragmented system of energy regulation, from both jurisdictional
and substantive perspectives. Congress, as discussed above, did not
provide in the Federal Power Act a comprehensive utility regulatory
scheme. Many federal agencies possess jurisdiction over utility company operations and facilities, including the F.P.C., the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the Environmental Protection Agency. The same situation exists within the states where various state and local agencies possess
varying degrees of control over utility companies.
This fragmentation is especially severe with respect to regulation of the impact of utility facilities on the natural environment.
In some states, one agency, arguing from esthetic grounds, is able
to overturn a prior finding of another agency that new facilities
should be built on the basis of need and that their design and location is in the interest of the public.72 One judgment of this situation
is that:
power plants and transmission lines ..
are subject to too many
different authorities with the capacity to undo each other's efforts
and to delay the installation of needed facilities. The consequence
is greater expense and a larger risk that the industry will lack
sufficient reserve capacity to meet regional needs.73
69. Miller, supra note 8 at 662-663.
70. Id. at 644.
71. The central theme in literature critical of regulatory bodies is that regulators are
overwhelmed by the expertise, knowledge, resources, and political skill of the regulated company. Lacking the spirit and ability to "take on" a company in the regulatory process, the
agency compromises with or capitulates to the company. See, e.g., J. BAUER, TRANSFORMING
PUBLC UTILITY REGULATION (1950); J. BAUER, UPDATING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1966); M.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); L. KOHLMEIER, THE
REGULATORS (1969); L. METCALF and V. REINEMER, OVERCHARGE (1967); and, M. MINTZ and J.
COHEN, AMERICA, INC. (1971).
72. See L. McKINSEY, CONSOLIDATED vs. FRAGMENTED STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1975).

73.

Miller, supra note 8 at 658.
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A range of reform measures has been put forth to deal with the
present and to anticipate the future electric utility situation, but
until now Congress has not adopted any approach. The more moderate proposals would build on the established state-federal scheme
of utility regulation, while the most radical approach would do away
with regulation altogether by establishing a government-owned and
managed public utility industry. Some of the proposals have been
introduced in Congress, and the status of other plans is still limited
to the public discussion stage. These various regulatory reform possibilities will be discussed below.
A.

Nationalizationof the Electric Power Industry

Perhaps the most radical approach to present regulatory problems is nationalization of the electric power industry. A bill introduced in the Ninety-second Congress would have established a National Power Grid Corporation consisting of publicly-owned regional
corporations." Under this plan, regional production companies,
which would operate generation plants and transmission lines on an
interstate basis, would be separated from local distribution
companies. This bill, like the measures to restructure the power
industry and to alter the F.P.C.'s jurisdiction, discussed below, has
not been enacted.
This plan is prompted by the inherent weakness of utility regulation. It would radically restructure the public utility industry so
that its operation and management more closely approached the
model of a single system. Support for such a proposal is found in a
recent study of the F.P.C. by two leading experts in the utility
regulation field. They come to the following conclusion:
[e]nergy policy planners, who are now groping with the problems
posed by the need for economy, reliability, and environmental protection, ought not to look to traditional regulation for solutions.7
The primary problem with regulation, according to the authors
Breyer and MacAvoy, is the inevitable but crippling distance between the regulators and the regulated company. In their view, the
F.P.C.'s failures:
. . . go beyond any lack of adequate statutory authority. They
spring in large part from the practical difficulties involved in having regulators make complex managerial decisions or in finding
incentives for private managers that would lead them to make
decisions more to the regulator's liking. The problems also derive
74. H.R. 9970, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See E. Cowan, National Power Grid's Time
Has Come, THE MissouLuN (New York Times News Service), March 30, 1975, at 6.
75. BREYER, supra note 9 at 133.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1976

15

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana
Law Review, LAW
Vol. 37 [1976],
Iss. 1, Art. 1

[Vol. 37

in part from the tendency of the agency to respond to problems as
they arise-incrementally, the tendency to pull away from sustained long-term planning in favor of attacks on whatever arises.76
The judgment here is that regulation cannot "create a rationalized
power industry" and that "to expect the F.P.C. to plan for the wellbeing of the power industry (or the industry's consumers) is utopian."7 7
The solution Breyer and MacAvoy propose seeks the same goals
as other reform plans, that is, a unified industrial system, coordinated planning, centralized control of operations, interstate scope,
economic benefits of large scale facilities, and minimal environmental damage. The essence of their proposal is direct governmental
involvement in the ownership and management of the electric power
industry:
Such governmental involvement might take a variety of forms,
ranging from the creation of special task forces with power to order
the building of particular lines and plants to the creation of industry/government regional power authorities with direct planning
and operating responsibilities."
Large publicly-owned regional corporations controlled by the government might allow a better-planned power industry, an equitable
rate structure and price level, and increased environmental consciousness.
B.

Major Regulatory Realignment

A less radical approach than nationalization of the electric utility industry is realignment of the utility regulatory relationship between states and the federal government, shifting the balance of
power to Washington. This proposal was set forth in a 1970 FORDHAM
LAW REVIEW article by John T. Miller, Jr.79 Although this plan has
not been presented to Congress, it is valuable as a thorough discussion of the relationship between energy needs and regulatory inadequacies. Miller argued the nation should be divided into regions,
each region having a single federally-chartered corporation engaged
in generating and transmitting electricity in interstate commerce.
The regional corporations would be privately-owned utilities formed
out of the facilities and easements of currently autonomous corporations. The large regional corporations would wholesale electricity to
small, state-based distribution companies. The existence of a single
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 119.
Id.
Id. at 133-134.
Miller, supra note 8.
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regional generating and transmitting corporation would preclude
the problems of multi-company coordination and planning and insure such benefits as cost savings, service reliability, and conservation of natural resources.
The F.P.C., under Miller's plan, would be given "complete licensing, financing, and rate jurisdiction over the regional public
utility corporations." ' 0 Miller would centralize under federal control
the environmental aspects of utility regulation as much as the rate
and operational aspects. When a regional public utility corporation
would apply to the F.P.C. for a license to build generation and
transmission facilities, the matter would be resolved in one forum
with one hearing. A federal hearing examiner would conduct the
proceedings in the area most directly affected by the proposed
plant, and there would be no other hearing on the same application
before any other governmental body at any level.8 ' The only prescribed subsequent proceeding would be judicial review on limited
grounds.
C.

State, Federal, and Industry Cooperation

Congress has considered reform proposals which preserve to a
greater degree the present framework of utility operation and regulatory jurisdiction than does Miller's plan. While Miller calls for
substantial centralization in both the industry and regulatory sectors, another approach consists of increased cooperation among
state and federal regulators and industry representatives. Most energy regulation proposals that Congress has considered in recent
years have been built on this cooperation model.
The Electric Power Coordination Act of 1971, ' 2 for example,
stated that its objectives "shall be achieved as far as possible
through consultative processes and in particular through intergovernmental cooperation. 8' 3 Under this bill, industry dominated regional councils would have formulated construction plans and coordination standards, and the F.P.C., in cooperation with other federal and state agencies, would have certified the plans before construction began. State governments were left with the power to regulate locations of facilities. Similarly, the Electric Power Supply and
Environmental Protection Act of 1971 s1 would have required regional councils to file an annual document with both the F.P.C. and
a state agency detailing advance construction plans. The state
80. Id. at 665.
81. Id.
82. H.R. 6972, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
83. Id. at § 4(b).
84. H.R. 11066, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
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agency would have been authorized by the bill to handle all siting
issues within its jurisdiction, and the Secretary of the Interior would
have been designated to coordinate all federal proceedings concerning construction and operation of bulk power facilities and to coordinate such federal activities with the proceedings of state authorities.
Both acts would have left present areas of state and federal control
largely untouched.
Other bills have been introduced in Congress that would expand the authority of the F.P.C. even while calling for extensive
state, federal, and industry cooperation. The Electric Power Reliability Act of 1967 s1 would have established regional planning councils to coordinate construction plans and to establish reliability
standards. Additionally, it would have given the F.P.C. authority
to mandate the interconnection of interstate electric facilities on its
own initiative and to review plans for extra-high-voltage transmission lines for compliance with reliability, land use, and esthetic
standards.
Two other bills were introduced in 1971 in the Ninety-second
Congress which sought to increase federal control over location of
utility facilities. These two bills were the Electric Power Plant Siting Act of 19716 and the Power Plant Siting Act of 1971.87 The first
bill would have required the F.P.C. only to:
conduct a national powerplant siting study and prepare a comprehensive national powerplant siting plan for the purpose of designating optimum locations for large power generating facilities of all
types to insure availability of an abundant, low-cost, and reliable
supply of electricity

. ..

and to protect environmental as-

sets. .... 88
The second bill was even less reform-minded, leaving the states the
responsibility "for the certification of sites and related bulk power
supply facilities of any electric entity." 9 Provision was made for a
company to take an unfavorable decision of the state certifying
agency to the federal certifying agency if the lower body had not
acted "upon a timely or conclusive basis.""
The measures discussed in this section, none of which were
enacted, built in varying degrees on the present state-federal utility
regulatory scheme. The accent was on cooperation and coordination
of regulatory efforts, even though some bills would have enhanced
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

S. 1621 and H.R. 6485, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967).
H.R. 1079, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
H.R. 5277, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
H.R. 1079, supra note 86, § 2.
H.R. 5277, supra note 87, § 5(a).
Id. at § 6(d).
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the states' position and others would have considerably strengthened federal regulatory power. Other regulatory proposals are being
discussed, however, that would simply strengthen state regulatory
commissions. These, it would appear, stand the greatest chance of
acceptance because of their moderation and the support of the present administration.
D.

Strengthening State Commissions

The F.E.A. in its

PROJECT INDEPENDENCE REPORT9

recom-

mended using existing state regulatory commissions as the primary
vehicle for resolving problems in the electric power industry. The
Report gave strong encouragement to state commissions to act along
specified lines and stated that, in the event of state inaction,
amendments to the Federal Power Act would be sought to make the
desired regulatory activity mandatory. The important point is that
the states would do the regulating and not a federal agency.
The F.E.A. began with the assertion that regulatory action was
needed 1) to diminish demand for electricity, 2) to increase significantly efficiency in electricity generation and transmission, and 3,l
to discourage the use of scarce fuels for generating electricity. 2 To
accomplish these objectives, the following tactics were
recommended: 1) new rate structures and metering practices to
level peak demand periods, 2) interconnection of utility systems
that have complementary peak demand periods, and 3) joint state
commission and utility company activities to reduce consumer demand. " The F.E.A. also said that state regulatory officials should
be encouraged to permit utility companies automatically to pass
through to their customers any increases in costs of generating electricity."4 This use of an "automatic adjustment" procedure precludes the holding of a regulatory hearing on the rate increases. The
rate increase is also meant to be a method of moderating demand.
The F.E.A. rejected a number of alternative approaches for
realizing its objectives." Reliance on such market forces as a leveling of population and income growth and the relative price of electricity to other energy forms was judged to be too uncertain. Largescale federal involvement had too many political and financial
drawbacks, given the significance of the traditional state role in
91.

F.E.A. REPORT, supra note 10.
92. Id. at 182 in Appendix.
93. Id. at 173-174.
94. Id. at 288. See Montana Consumer Counsel v. P.S.C. and Mont. Power Co., Mont.
,P.2d -,
32 St. Rep. 1026,1032 (1975), which upholds the use of automatic
adjustment clauses under pre-1975 Montana law. But see R.C.M. 1947, § 70-113 for a 1975
amendment which prohibits an increase in utility rates without a hearing.
95. F.E.A. REPORT, supra note 10 at 190.
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utility regulation. And complete reliance on voluntary state
commission-utility company cooperation was rejected because of
the industry's traditional conservatism with respect to innovations
and the unpredictability of the commissions in the face of massive
consumer protests. The chosen method, therefore, was a mild nudging of the state commissions by the federal government, to be followed by stronger measures if compliance were not forthcoming.
The F.E.A.'s approach emphasizes the state's role in the American scheme of federalism. According to this theory, states and their
agencies are experimental units for the nation with respect to policy
innovations. The state utility commissions are given the first opportunity to initiate energy conservation measures. Program results
then could be more broadly adopted at the state level through federal encouragement.
V.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE
UTILITY SYSTEMS

For the last decade, regulatory reform proposals have repeatedly appeared before Congress. Congressional failure to enact any
of these proposals is not indicative of a lack of concern, but seems
to reflect a lack of consensus. If a new policy is formulated by Congress, its complexion undoubtedly will be moderate, given the conflicting interests concerned. It can be expected, therefore, that
states will continue to dominate utility regulation.
Continuation of the present regulatory pattern will inevitably
produce a head-on conflict between local interests and regional energy demands. The Colstrip siting controversy in Montana may
represent a preview of widespread conflicts of a similar nature. This
problem occurs when one state's strong environmentalism results in
denial of certification of part of an interconnected utility system.
Because future congressional action probably will not resolve this
regional-state clash, the matter could come before the United States
Supreme Court " by way of a challenge to state obstruction of interstate commerce. 7
96. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925); Bradley v. Pub. Util. Com., 289 U.S. 92 (1933); and California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941) for examples of the Supreme Court's entertainment of
challenges to a state regulation of interstate commerce.
97. See Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. U.S. (The Shreveport Case), 234 U.S. 342
(1914); N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); and Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), for discussion of the scope of the commerce power, See also
Public Util. Com. of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927); F.P.C. v. Union
Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965); and Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. F.P.C., 95 S.Ct. 1066
(1975), for the rule that projects which generate electricity for interstate transmission affect
commerce among the states and are therefore within the scope of the federal commerce power.
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The intervention of courts in such a controversy has longstanding recognition under the Constitution. In construing the Commerce
Clause, the Supreme Court has reserved to itself the task of determining the limits of permissible state action with respect to interstate commerce. The Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona" gave
clear definition to this role:
For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine
that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical
to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress
has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislatures, is under
the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands
of state and national interests."
In keeping with its role as umpire of the federal system, the
Court has formulated a number of tests to be used in measuring the
impact of state action on interstate commerce.'0 Interpretation of
the Commerce Clause has been typified by consideration of several
factors. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for a particularized, case-by-case application of a variety of tests in determining the legitimacy of state action.'0 ' Such tests for analyzing challenges to state action based on the Commerce Clause can be
grouped into two general categories: 1) congressional pre-emption of
a policy area, and 2) state action running afoul of Congress' dormant
0
commerce power.'1
Compared to the application of the dormant commerce power
tests, the pre-emption test is relatively easy to apply. The preemption approach consists of a determination of whether federal
legislation occupies an area in such a way that state action is precluded. When Congress has clearly stated its intent to occupy a
field, a court has no problem in finding pre-emption.'03 Conflicting
state action in such a case would be invalidated. Where congressional intent to pre-empt state action has not been clearly stated, a
finding of pre-emption is possible, although it requires a more exacting analysis.' 4 Pre-emption, however, is not at issue in the controversy over certification of the Colstrip generating plants, since the
98.
99.

325 U.S. 761 (1945).
Id. at 769.
100. Id. at 770.
101. Colorado Anti-discrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S.
714, 720 (1963).
102. Note, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1762, 1769 (1974).
103. The basis of a finding of pre-emption by act of Congress is the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution: U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
104. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960), citing
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
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United States Supreme Court has ruled that the F.P.C. has no
licensing jurisdiction over thermal electric generating units.0 5
Even though Congress has neither directly nor by implication
authorized a federal agency to pass upon project applications for
plants like those at Colstrip, challenges based on the Commerce
Clause to state regulatory action may still arise. The Supreme Court
has held that state action affecting commerce may be invalid even
in the absence of conflicting federal regulation. 06 In this instance
the Court acts as the guardian of a range of federal commerce powers which, even though dormant, are protected from state intrusion.
The Court at various times has articulated three separate tests for
state action in possible conflict with the dormant commerce power.
These three tests, all of which remain available for the Court's use,
will be discussed in relation to the Montana siting controversy.
The earliest elaboration of the extent of the dormant commerce
power was in the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia.0 7 Here, the Supreme Court set down the uniformlocal subject test, and made some statements which may be applicable to the Colstrip situation. The Court inquired whether a state
interest, expressed through a state regulatory scheme, was overshadowed by a national interest in the absence of congressional action.
The Court held that Congress retained complete power over certain
subjects even when it had failed to take positive action. Whether or
not Congress possessed exclusive control would be determined by
the circumstances of each case. Specifically, the Court said:
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly
be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress.0 8

The states would be free to act, therefore, in those areas where a
uniform approach was not required.
The pertinent question here is whether such a regulatory subject as location of utility facilities is of "national" concern and demands a uniform approach, or whether it is primarily of local concern and should be handled differently in the various states. In
applying the uniform-local subject test, the Court could be influenced by the contemporary arguments, discussed above, that the
benefits of environmental protection, cost savings, and operational
efficiency are tied to an integrated regional electric industry. In such
105. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. F.P.C., supra note 42 at 1076.
106. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 19 U.S. (12 Howard)
143 (1851).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 319.
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a situation, the Court could rule that electric power has become a
matter of essentially national proportion, and that some forms of
state regulation, which take into account only local considerations,
are therefore invalid.
An interesting and analogous case which the Court might
choose to rely upon in reaching such a result is Wabash, St.L. & P.
Ry. Co. v. Illinois.'° Here the Court invalidated long-standing state
control over interstate railroad rates because such rates, in the
Court's view, required uniform regulation by Congress. Utilizing the
Cooley rule, the Court found that control by individual states
caused an unacceptable disruption of commerce. Four months later,
Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission"' in
order to provide the uniform regulatory scheme the Court viewed as
necessary."'
The second test available to the Court in determining whether
a state action conflicts with the dormant commerce power of Congress can be called the degree of burden test. This test says that
state regulation is valid only if it affects interstate commerce indirectly or incidentally. As such, the distinction between allowable
and invalid state action is a matter of degree. A clear expression of
this test is found in Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co. of Embden,"2
where the Supreme Court said:
[A] state statute enacted for admissible state purposes and which
affects interstate commerce only incidentally and remotely is not
a prohibited state regulation in the sense of that clause

. . .

and

a state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens such commerce is a prohibited regulation 3and
invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted.1
The degree of burden test was used by the Supreme Court in a
1923 case,"' the facts of which closely parallel the potential situation that could be created by a refusal to certify thermal generating
plants in eastern Montana. In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the
legislature had cut off supply of natural gas from West Virginia to
Pennsylvania and Ohio. The Court ruled that "a state law, whether
of the State where the gas is produced or that where it is to be sold,
which by its necessary operation prevents, obstructs or burdens
such transmission is a regulation of interstate commerce-a prohib109. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, supra note 96.
110. 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
111. See Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 98 at 779, 782, and Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, supra note 104 at 448, for other statements of the uniformlocal subject test.
112. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co. of Embden, 268 U.S. 189 (1925).
113. Id. at 199. See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
114. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1976

23

Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
37 [1976],
Iss. 1, Art. 1
MONTANA
REVIEW

[Vol. 37

ited interference.""' The Court found favor with the complainants'
claim of irreparable injury: the gas was needed to heat homes, supply industries, and preserve jobs. In reaching its decision of the
statute's unconstitutionality, the Court observed that "the apprehensions of the complainant states respecting the injury which will
ensue from its enforcement are well founded and . . . it obviously
will operate most inequitably against these states. . . ."I" More-

over, the Court speculated, "[w]hat may be done with one natural
product may be done with others, and there are several states in
which the earth yields products of great value which are carried into
other states and there used.""' 7
A denial of certification by an agency of the State of Montana
would have the effect of prohibiting the flow in interstate commerce
of a commodity which residents of other states directly depend upon
for sustaining their general welfare. Such a prohibition would seem
to be neither indirect nor incidental. The effect of denying this flow
in interstate commerce to other states would mean that their residents could suffer economic disruption. The determinative fact here
would seem to be that the burden would be borne by persons other
than Montana residents:
The greater the impact on the local population relative to out-ofstaters, the8 more "incidental" is the burden on interstate
commerce."1

The third judicial test relative to the dormant commerce clause
involves the balancing of state and national interest. One of the
strongest formulations of this test is found in Southern Pacific Co.
v. Arizona."' This case involved a challenge to a 1912 Arizona act
which limited train lengths within the state. The Court found that
the obstruction of interstate commerce exceeded the safety benefits
derived from application of the act. The Court summarized the
approach it followed in reaching its decision as follows:
The decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total
effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and
casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it. . .

.

2

The balancing test possibly permits a court to give fuller consideration to the complete array of interests involved in a commerce
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 596-597.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 596.
Note, 87 H.hv. L. Rav. 1762, 1775 (1974).
Southern Pac Ry. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 98.
Id. at 775-776.
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clause controversy than do the prior two tests discussed. This test
applied to the possible denial of certification of the Colstrip plants
could allow consideration of such Montana interests as environmental integrity, public health, and safety.' These state objectives
would be weighed against the concern in other states for possible job
losses, retardation of economic growth, and public safety hazards
occasioned by inadequate energy supplies.
The denial of certification thus could be upheld if a court found
that the consequent burden on interstate commerce was less significant than achievement of the state's objectives. To reach such a
decision, it would seem that the court must find that the quality of
life Montana sought to preserve for its residents was not arbitrarily
high when compared to the health and safety standards of other
states. The court also might find that the burden on commerce was
reduced by the availability of an alternative avenue of commercethe shipment of Montana coal by train to be used for generating
electricity near the site of its consumption.'"
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has argued that there are good reasons for giving
serious thought to realigning federal and state jurisdiction concerning regulation of utility plant siting. If such restructuring occurs, the
federal government undoubtedly will be the recipient of increased
jurisdiction and power, and the stature of state regulation accordingly will be diminshed. New regulatory policy of this sort will have
to be made by the United States Congress, although the United
States Supreme Court, by ruling on the question of state regulation
of interstate commerce, could set the tone for subsequent congressional action.
There have been no major amendments to the Federal Power
Act in recent years. Demands on the electric power industry and
available technology, however, have changed considerably. The industry has become increasingly more interdependent, and the solu121. In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, supra note 104, the Supreme Court
found that a regulation based on state police power, and relating to protection of air quality,
could stand even though interstate commerce was thereby burdened. But see, Lemke v.
Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 58 (1922) for an opposite result regarding a state environmental regulation affecting commerce.
122. See Bradley v. Public Util. Com. of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92 (1932). In this case the
Supreme Court upheld a state's denial of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to
an interstate carrier where the state's action was based on considerations of public safety.
The Court found, among other things, that the burden on interstate commerce did not
outweigh the benefits derived from the denial because alternative truck routes were available
to the carrier. In the Montana situation, however, the alternative course available to the
applicant utilities might be viewed as so different from the originally anticipated mode of
commerce as to be unfeasible and, therefore, not a proper "alternative."
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tion to its present problems appears to require an even greater degree of interdependence. Utility regulation, it has been argued, may
have to be adjusted to reflect the essentially interstate character of
the electric power industry.
National jurisdiction and expanded regulatory powers for the
Federal Power Commission would mean reduced regulatory powers
for the states. Montana, for example, could lose considerable control
over how its natural resources are to be developed and used. If the
United States Supreme Court were to set the trend toward national
regulation, the situation would be not unlike school segregation and
legislative apportionment following the Supreme Court decisions of
Brown v. Board of Education'2 3 and Baker v. Carr.'2 ' States could
again be forced to give up control over a policy area that arguably
should have been left to local discretion.
In the matter of utility regulation, many signs point to some
form of nationalization. The quandary Montana could find itself in
is one of the oldest predicaments of our federal form of government.
Pro-state pronouncements echo the nullification arguments of John
C. Calhoun. For some Montanans, however, a way of life and not
rhetoric is at stake. But, it is unlikely that narrow, state sentiments
will bear much weight in the coming era of utility regulation.
123.
124.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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